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THE MAGNUSON-MOSS WARRANTY ACT
AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: A
SURVEY OF WARRANTY PROTECTION IN
CONSUMER SALES TRANSACTIONS
Keith J. Hey*
For many years warranties have confused and misled the American
consumers. A warranty is a complicated legal document whose full
essence lies buried in myriads of reported legal discussions and in
complicated State codes of commercial law. The consumers' understanding of what a warranty on a particular product means to him
frequently does not coincide with the legal meaning. .

.

. Today,

most consumers have little understanding of the frequently complex
legal implications of warranties on consumer products.'
These comments, included in the report submitted by the
Committee on Commerce accompanying the bill that was to become
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act,2 accurately describe the disorderly melang6 encountered by the modern American consumer in the field of warranties.
In particular, provisions for disclaimer of warranties and limitation
of remedies or damages in transactions involving the sale of goods
have been the source of confusion and extensive litigation during
recent years. Unless state legislation provided special treatment for
consumer transactions, the respective states' adoption of Article 2
of the Uniform Commercial Code 3 has provided the primary source
for resolving disputes involving warranty provisions. Partly for this
reason, and because decisions varied substantially from one jurisdiction to another, the state of the law in the warranty field has, in
the past, been difficult to assess.
* Professor of Law, University of Dayton. B.S.C., Creighton University, 1955; J.D.,
Creighton University, 1963; LL.M., Georgetown University, 1969.
1. S. REP. No. 151, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1973).
2. Full title of this legislation is the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-11 (Supp. V 1975) [hereinafter referred to as
the Warranty Act]. Only Title I of the Warranty Act is discussed in this article; Title II covers
changes in the Federal Trade Commission Act.
3. The UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE [hereinafter cited as UCC or the Code] was promulgated in 1951 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the
American Law Institute. It was first adopted in 1953 in the state of Pennsylvania, effective
July 1, 1954. All states, with the exception of Louisiana, have adopted the U.C.C. The District
of Columbia and the Virgin Islands have also adopted the Code. All references are to the 1962
Official Text and Comments.
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The Code, particularly sections 2-3161 and 2-719,1 while approving the modification of warranties and remedies (including damages) in sale of goods transactions, calls for application of essentially
the same regulatory provisions to both commercial and consumer
contracts.' Recently, however, both state legislatures and judicial
decisions have recognized the need for separate treatment of commercial and consumer sales transactions.
Of greater significance, however, is the recently enacted
U.C.C. § 2-316:
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and words
or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever reasonable
as consistent with each other; but subject to the provisions of this Article on parol or
extrinsic evidence (Section 2-202) negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent
that such construction is unreasonable.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case
of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of
fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude all
implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are no
warranties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof."
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties are
excluded by expressions like "as is", "with all faults" or other language which
in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied warranty; and
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the goods
or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused to examine the goods
there is no implied warranty with regard to defects which an examination ought
in the circumstances to have revealed to him; and
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by course of dealing
or course of performance or usage of trade.
(4) Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in accordance with the provisions of this Article on liquidation or limitation of damages and on contractual modification of remedy (Sections 2-718 and 2-719).
5. U.C.C. § 2-719:
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section and of the
preceding section on liquidation and limitation of damages,
(a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in substitution
for those provided in this Article and may limit or alter the measure of damages
recoverable under this Article, as by limiting the buyer's remedies to return of
the goods and repayment of the price or to repair and replacement of nonconforming goods or parts; and
(b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy is expressly
agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole remedy.
(2) Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act.
(3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or
exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the
person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of
damages where the loss is commercial is not.
6. A distinction was made, however, in the handling of limitations on consequential
damages under U.C.C. § 2-719(3). See note 5 supra.
4.
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Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, wherein warranties on consumer products have been singled out for exclusive regulation. Intended to "improve the adequacy of information available to consumers, prevent deception,
and improve competition in the marketing of consumer products," 7
the Warranty Act has opened a new chapter in the struggle to enlarge the protection afforded the consumer in a merchandise sales
contract. A contract covering "consumer goods" and containing an
express warranty, now requires compliance with the provisions of
this new federal legislation, thus carving out a substantial degree of
preemption in a field of commercial activity previously regulated by
the states. The changes in disclaimer of warranties brought about
by the Warranty Act will no doubt have a substantial impact on the
sales practices currently followed by manufacturers and sellers of
"consumer products." The repercussions of the Warranty Act cannot be fully appreciated, however, without examining the earlier
stages through which contract provisions involving disclaimer of
warranties and limitation of remedies and damages have passed.
Therefore, Part I of this article will review the state of the law prior
to enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code. Part II will undertake a discussion of the pertinent Uniform Commercial Code sections relating to warranties, disclaimer of warranties and limitation
of remedies or damages. In Part III, this article will describe the
more significant provisions of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act,
particularly those which relate to disclaimer of warranties and limitation of remedies or damages. In Part IV, the projected impact
of the Warranty Act upon the relevant Uniform Commercial Code
provisions will be discussed.
I.

COMMON LAW AND OTHER PRE-UCC RECOGNITION OF WARRANTY
DISCLAIMERS AND LIMITATION OF REMEDIES OR DAMAGES

In order to determine the validity of any warranty disclaimer
provision, it is necessary to presume the existence of some warranty.
There was little in the common law approach to the sale of goods
which might have given rise to such a presumption. "Caveat emptor" aptly described the perspective from which the law viewed the
sales transaction.8 Absent fraud or the inclusion of an express war7. 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a) (Supp. V. 1975).
8. Hargous v. Stone, 5 N.Y. 73, 80 (1851): "Caveat emptor is an ancient rule of common
law, and stands in contradistinction to the rule of caveat venditor.
...
It means that where
a sale of goods is not accompanied by an express warranty by the seller, and there is no fraud
on his part, the buyer must stand all losses arising from latent defect.
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ranty within the agreement, the buyer assumed the risk of any losses
from defects. Even payment of the purchase price did not give rise
to an implied warranty that the goods were sound.'
As the law of contracts began to recognize the public policy
argument favoring the attachment of implied warranties to sale of
goods transactions, the implied warranties of merchantability and
fitness for a particular purpose gradually emerged. 0
The Uniform Sales Act" allowed the contracting parties to vary
or negate rights or duties by agreement or course of dealing," but
the form used in the avoidance or variance was not detailed in the
statute. As disclaimer of warranties and damage limitation clauses
became fairly common terms in sales contracts, the general language of the Uniform Sales Act necessitated extensive judicial interpretation and construction. The result was often an avoidance of the
disclaimer or limitation as the court strictly construed the clause
against the seller or other party asserting its validity. For example,
a seller's duty to faithfully perform basic contract obligations could
not be avoided by a disclaimer clause. 3 Several courts negated disclaimers by drawing a distinction between warranties implied in
4
fact as part of the contract and those warranties imposed by law.
Therefore, the statement that "no warranties have been made" was
construed to mean that the seller was excluding only contractual
warranties and not those imposed by law."
9. Miller v. Tiffany, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 298, 309 (1863): Caveat emptor means that
"[w]here there is neither fraud nor warranty, the buyer receives and retains the goods,
without objection, he waives the right to object afterwards, and is finally concluded." The
fact that he paid full price for the goods does not raise an implied warranty that the goods
are sound. See also Barnard v. Kellog, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 383 (1870) for a similar declaration
of caveat emptor.
10. See the cases on "merchantability" collected and discussed in Annot., 21 A.L.R.
367 (1922). The issue of "fitness for a particular use" in cases decided prior to the Uniform
Sales Act is thoroughly examined and documented in Dushame v. Benedict, 120 U.S. 630
(1886); and Kellog Bridge Co. v. Hamilton, 110 U.S. 108 (1884).
11. The Uniform Sales Act was promulgated in 1906 and subsequently adopted by 37
states. See Malcom, Uniform Commercial Code in ABA UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
HANDBOOK

1, 3 (1964).

12. Section 71 of the Uniform Sales Act stated: "Where any right, duty or liability
would arise under a contract to sell or a sale by implication of law, it may be negated or varied
by express agreement or by the course of dealing between the parties, or by custom ..
UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED, 3 U.C.C. 401 (Master ed. West 1968).
13. Swift & Co. v. Aydlett, 192 N.C. 330, 135 S.E. 141 (1926); Smith v. Oscar H. Will
& Co., 51 N.D. 357, 199 N.W. 861 (1924).
14. Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N.W. 799 (1927). See also Hobart Mfg. Co.
v. Rodziewicz, 125 Pa. Super. 240, 189 A. 580 (1937); National Equipment Corp. v. Moore,
189 Minn. 632, 250 N.W. 677 (1933); Hardy v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 38 Ga. App.
463, 144 S.E. 327 (1928); Main v. Dearing, 73 Ark. 470, 84 S.W. 640 (1905); contra, Larson v.
Inland Seed Co., 143 Wash. 557, 255 P. 919 (1927).
15. See cases cited note 14 supra.
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Disclaimer clauses were held to be an unenforceable part of the
contract where the disclaimers were placed on cards which were
packaged with the merchandise," on invoices accompanying the
goods, 7 or in fine print on the back of the contract." Special statutes
were adopted in some jurisdictions to negate attempts to disclaim
warranties on certain types of goods. For example, a North Dakota statute voided warranty disclaimers in retail machinery sales
contracts for public policy reasons, allowing rescission by the purchaser within a reasonable time after delivery if the machinery was
unfit for its specified purpose.2
The pre-UCC courts did, however, recognize use of the term "as
is" or a similar statement to operate as a disavowal of all warranties. 21 Moreover, a contract term limiting the remedies available for
breach of warranty (now covered by UCC section 2-719) was held
effective and one court treated the stated remedy as exclusive.2 2 An
exclusive remedy must, however, be a truly effective remedy. In

Ford Motor Co. v. Cullum, 23 an automobile purchaser successfully

avoided an exclusive remedy clause where the remedy given (replacement of parts) did not remove the defective condition in the
vehicle.
One of the major pre-UCC decisions which limited the effect of
warranty disclaimers in a consumer contract was Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 24 in which the New Jersey Supreme Court
invalidated, as contrary to public policy, a provision for the disclaimer of warranties in a standard form automobile sales contract.
In recognizing that the economic strength of the automobile industry enabled it to dictate the contract terms, the court found a total
lack of equal bargaining power between the parties. The court
stated:
16.
17.
18.
19.

Black v. B.B. Kirkland Seed Co., 158 S.C. 112, 155 S.E. 268 (1930).
Edgar v. Breck & Sons Corp., 172 Mass. 581, 52 N.E. 1083 (1899).
Moorhead v. Minneapolis Seed Co., 139 Minn. 11, 165 N.W. 484 (1917).
E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-277.11 (1975) (seed).

20. N.D.

CENT. CODE

§ 51-07-07 (1960).

21. Industrial Rayon Corp. v. Clifton Mills, 310 Pa. 322, 165 A. 385 (1933); R.E. Brooks
Co. v. Storr, 111 N.J.L. 316, 168 A. 382 (Ct. Err. & App. 1933); Union Trust Co. v. Detroit
River Transit Co., 162 Mich. 670, 127 N.W. 780 (1910). See the text accompanying notes 6877 infra for a discussion of disclaimer through use of the term "as is" or similar statement.
22. Wallich Ice Mach. Co. v. Hanewald, 275 Mich. 607, 267 N.W. 748 (1936).
23. 96 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1938). See also Detwiler v. Downes, 119 Minn. 44, 137 N.W. 422
(1912).
24. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). See also Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 59 Misc. 2d 241,
298 N.Y.S.2d 538 (Sup. Ct. 1969) and Zabrinski Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441,
240 A.2d 195 (Sup. Ct. 1968). For a rejection of the public policy arguments presented in the
Henningsen case, see Marshall v. Murray Oldsmobile Co., 207 Va. 972, 154 S.E.2d 140 (1967).
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The disclaimer of the implied warranty and exclusion of all obligations except those specifically assumed by the express warranty
signify a studied effort to frustrate that protection. True, the Sales
Act authorizes agreements between buyer and seller qualifying the
warranty obligations. But quite obviously, the legislature contemplated lawful stipulations (which are determined by the circumstances of a particular case) arrived at freely by parties of relatively equal
bargaining strength. The lawmakers did not authorize the automobile manufacturer to use its grossly disproportionate bargaining
power to relieve itself from liability and to impose on the ordinary
buyer, who in effect has no real freedom of choice, the grave danger
of injury to himself and others that attends the sale of such dangerous
instrumentality as a defectively made automobile. In the framework
of this case, illuminated as it is by the facts and the many decisions
noted, we are of the opinion that Chrysler's attempted disclaimer of
an implied warranty of merchantability and of the obligations arising
therefrom is so inimical to the public good as to compel an adjudication of its invalidity. 5
The inherent power of individuals and associations to freely
bargain for the terms of their contract is a concept underlying all
contract law and was a cornerstone in the enactment of the Uniform
Commercial Code. 6 The adoption of the Code did not, however,
resolve the problem posed by the disparity in bargaining power
which was at issue in the Henningsen case. Rarely does the Code
create a special rule for consumer goods or exclude retail sales from
the impact of its provisions. 27 Rather, commercial and noncommercial transactions are essentially governed by the same
terms. Nevertheless, the concern articulated in the pre-UCC, noncommercial cases, such as Henningsen, continued to find expression
in cases decided under the Code.

II.

DISCLAIMER OR MODIFICATION OF WARRANTIES, EXCLUSION OF
REMEDIES AND LIMITATION OF DAMAGES UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
Section 2-316 contains the terms on disclaimer or modification

25. 32 N.J. 358, 385, 161 A.2d 69, 95 (1960).

26. See Kansas City Structural Steel Co. v. L.G. Barcus & Sons, Inc., 217 Kan. 88, 535
P.2d 419, 424 (1975) in which the court stated: "The policy of the law in general is to permit
mentally competent parties to arrange their own contracts and fashion their own remedies
where no fraud or overreaching is practiced. Contracts freely arrived at and fairly made are
favorites of the law."
27. For purposes of this article, the special language involving consumer goods is that
of U.C.C. § 2-719(3) declaring the limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person
in the case of consumer goods to be prima facie unconscionable.
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of warranties under Article 2 transactions. 8 Although the primary
emphasis of the section is upon the disclaimer of implied warranties
of merchantiability and fitness for a particular purpose, the problems inherent in disavowing express warranties are likewise substantial. 29 The separate consideration of express and implied warranties in this discussion is, to a certain extent, artificial since most
disclaimer provisions attempt to negate both express and implied
warranties. Certain problems, however, are exclusive to disclaimers
of express warranties, and these will be dealt with separately below.
A.

Express Warranties

Any affirmation of fact, promise, description or sample which
becomes or is made a part of the "basis of the bargain" creates an
express warranty under UCC section 2-313. 30 Attempts to limit or
exclude an express warranty will be given effect only if such construction is reasonably consistent with the warranty itself. One
method commonly employed to achieve this purpose is to set out an
express warranty in the contract, usually for a specified time period
or with other limitations, and make that warranty in lieu of all other
31
warranties, express or implied.
Although words of description in a contract will normally create
an express warranty, the courts do not always give such effect to the
language. For example, the language used to describe the machinery
28. U.C.C. § 2-102 states that Article 2 applies to "transactions" in goods.
29. Many of the problems on express warranties will be dealt with by U.C.C. § 2-317,
which states the rules on cumulation and conflict of warranties. See note 34 infra for the text
of § 2-317.
30. U.C.C. § 2-313:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which
relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an
express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates
an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or

model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use
formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific intention to
make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement
purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does not
create a warranty.
31. "The warranty described in this paragraph shall be IN LIEU of any other warranty,
express or implied, including but not limited to, any implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or fitness for a particular purpose." J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
358 (1972), making reference to Koellmer v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 6 Conn. 478, 276 A.2d
807 (Cir. Ct. 1970).
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sold under one contract was held to be merely "an expectation"
where the machinery was to be used in connection with a still unproven manufacturing process. Hence, such language could not be
32
considered "part of the basis of the bargain." In light of such
findings the court was able to construe the disclaimer of all warran-33
ties as consistent with the descriptive language of the instrument.
Furthermore, the UCC provides that express and implied warranties are to be construed as consistent with each other and as cumulaconflict
tive. 34 The intention of the parties is used to resolve any
35
unreasonable.
is
consistency
of
construction
a
where such
A conflict or ambiguity between an express warranty and an
attempted exclusion of warranties will be resolved in favor of the
express warranty.36 One illustration of this principle involved a contract for the conversion of a heating system and replacement of
parts. Although the printed contract contained a disclaimer of liability for personal injury or property damage, a provision had been
typed-in, stating that the installation was to be done in a workmanlike manner; in addition, a one year guarantee was issued. The court
held the typed-in warranty effective against the printed disclaimer.3 7 Likewise, the inclusion of a specific statement (express
warranty) on the face of the agreement is sufficient to render inoperative a provision on the back of the 8agreement stating that there are
no warranties, express or implied.
32. United States Fibres, Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 509 F.2d 1043, 1046 (6th Cir.
1975) [hereinafter cited as U.S. Fibres].
33. Id.
34. U.C.C. § 2-317:
Warranties whether express or implied shall be construed as consistent with each
other and as cumulative, but if such construction is unreasonable the intention of the
parties shall determine which warranty is dominant. In ascertaining that intention the
following rules apply:
(a) Exact or technical specifications displace an inconsistent sample or model
or general language of description.
(b) A sample from an existing bulk displaces inconsistent general language of
description.
(c) Express warranties displace inconsistent implied warranties other than an
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
35. Id.
36. Id.; S-C Industries v. American Hydroponics System, Inc., 468 F.2d 852 (5th Cir.
1972); Mobile Housing, Inc. v. Stone, 490 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); Walsh v. Ford
Motor Co., 59 Misc. 2d 241, 298 N.Y.S.2d 538 (Sup. Ct. 1969); Tiger Motor Co. v. McMurtry,
284 Ala. 283, 224 So. 2d 638 (1969).
37. Henry v. W.S. Reichenbach & Son, Inc., 45 Pa. D. & C.2d 171 (Lehigh County
1968).
38. Realmuto v. Straub Motors, Inc., 65 N.J. 336, 322 A.2d 440 (1974). See also Chisholm v. J. R. Simplot Co., 94 Idaho 628, 495 P.2d 1113, 1116 n.4 (1972) (disclaimer of all
warranties in sale of weed killer not effective to disclaim express warranty on the package
that "this product kills weeds").
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Although section 2-316(2) imposes specific requirements for the
valid disclaimer of implied warranties, the section is noticeably silent on the form necessary to effectively disclaim express warranties. It is therefore possible to postulate a situation wherein the
disclaimer may be sufficient to exclude or limit an express warranty but lacks the details sufficient to disclaim an implied warranty.39 Thus, in Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Ingersoll
Rand Co.,10 the court held that an express warranty limiting the
effective period of the warranty to fifteen months from date of
shipment of goods was ineffective to negate an implied warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose. The contract was for the purchase of goods which were manufactured by the seller with the
knowledge that the goods would be stored until needed by the
purchaser.
A problem exclusive to the category of express warranties concerns statements relating to the goods which the seller or his agent
allegedly made but which are not found in the written contract.
Such representations or declarations, if not made a part of the writing, may be unenforceable due to the Parol Evidence Rule. 4 Section
2-316(1) states that its provisions are subject to section 2-202 dealing with parol evidence.
Nevertheless, the court may determine in some circumstances
that the written agreement was not intended as the final expression
of the parties and, thus, allow contradiction of the written terms by
parol evidence. 42 If the court finds a partial integration of the agreement, introduction of consistent additional terms is admissible." A
determination that the contract is totally integrated precludes the
introduction of contradictory terms, but explanation or supplemen39. See generally Forte Towers South, Inc. v. Hill York Sales Corp., 312 So. 2d 512 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
40. 9 UCC REP. SERv. 234 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971).
41. U.C.C. § 2-202:
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree or which
are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression of their
agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein may not be contradicted
by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may
be explained or supplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 1-205) or by course of performance (Section 2-208); and
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writing
to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the
terms of the agreement.
42. If other language in the contract is conflicting, the court can hold the writing to be
incomplete and look to parol evidence for explanation and clarification: 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN
ON CONTRACTS § 578, at 411 (1960); 4 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §
643, at 1082-83 (3d ed. 1961).
43. U.C.C. § 2-202(a).
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tation by reference to the parties' course of dealing, performance or
trade usage is allowed." Evidence of oral representations excluded
under the Parol Evidence Rule does not become admissible by characterizing the representation as an express warranty.4 5 The crossreference in section 2-316 to section 2-202 is intended to protect the
seller against allegations that warranties and unauthorized representations made orally are part of the contract." This protection is
subject to significant restrictions since the court must first determine the written contract between the parties to be the final, complete, and exclusive expression of their intent. A carefully worded
and appropriately placed paragraph identifying the contract as
completely integrated should be sufficient to exclude any alleged
express warranty not within the terms of the contract.47 The integration clause may be combined with a disclaimer provision, so long
as the appropriate language for disclaiming implied warranties is
used.48
If the disclaimer of express warranties is repugnant to the negotiated terms of the bargain in fact, the court may refuse to enforce
the disclaimer even though its terms comply with the statute.4 9
44. See note 41 supra for the text of U.C.C. § 2-202.
45. Shore Line Properties, Inc. v. Deer-O-Paints & Chemicals, Ltd., 24 Ariz. App. 331,
538 P.2d 760 (1975).
46. U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 2 provides:
The seller is protected under this Article against false allegations of oral warranties
by its provisions on parol and extrinsic evidence and against unauthorized representations by the customary "lack of authority" clauses. This Article treats the limitation
or avoidance of consequential damages as a matter of limiting remedies for breach,
separate from the matter of creation of liability under a warranty. If no warranty exists,
there is of course no problem of warranty. Under subsection (4) the question of limitation of remedy is governed by the sections referred to rather than by this section.
47. In Economy Forms Corp. v. Kandy, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 944, 949 (N.D. Ga. 1974),
aff'd, 511 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1974) the following language was held effective to exclude any
express warranties not included in the contract:
This agreement, together with the supplements, if any, attached hereto, incorporates
all agreements and understandings of every kind and nature concerned on the subject
matter hereof, and NO REPRESENTATION, WARRANTY (EXPRESS OR IMPLIED) OR ESTIMATE OF ANY KIND OR NATURE NOT INCORPORATED
HEREIN IS AUTHORIZED BY, NOR SHALL THE SAME BE BINDING ON ANY
OF THE PARTIES HERETO (Emphasis in original).
48. Investors Premium Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 389 F. Supp. 39, 45 (D.S.C. 1974),
found the merger-disclaimer clause to be effective:
THERE ARE NO UNDERSTANDINGS, AGREEMENTS, REPRESENTATIONS OR WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED (INCLUDING ANY REGARDING MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE)
NOT SPECIFIED HEREIN, RESPECTING THIS CONTRACT OR THE EQUIPMENT HEREUNDER. THIS CONTRACT STATES THE ENTIRE OBLIGATION
OF SELLER IN CONNECTION WITH THIS TRANSACTION (Emphasis in original).
49. Bowen v. Young, 507 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). See also Eckstein v. Cum-
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Furthermore, if the express warranty is represented as exclusive of
other warranties and the terms impose too onerous a burden on the
consumer in terms of his compliance therewith, then it may be
nullified.S°
B.

Implied Warranties

Section 2-316(2) permits a seller to disclaim the implied war-52
ranties of merchantability 5' and fitness for a particular purpose.
Under the more common method of disclaiming the implied warranty of merchantability, the seller must use the term
"merchantability" and the disclaimer, if in writing, must be
"conspicuous. '5 3 Disclaimer of a warranty for a particular purpose
must also be conspicuous, and in writing, but may be expressed in
general terms. A term or clause is conspicuous when so written "that
a reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have
noticed it."54 Furthermore, language will be conspicuous if it is a
mins, 41 Ohio App. 2d 1, 321 N.E.2d 897 (1974).
50. E.g., Foremost Mobile Homes Mfg. Corp. v. Steele, 506 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. Civ. App.
1974).
51. U.C.C. § 2-314:
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall
be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with
respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for value of food or drink
to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind,
quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may
require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of face made on the container or
label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied warranties may
arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.
52. U.C.C. § 2-315:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's
skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such
purpose.
53. See U.C.C. § 2-316(2) note 4 supra.
54. U.C.C. § 1-201(10):
"Conspicuous": A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so written that a
reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it. A printed
heading in capitals (as: NON-NEGOTIABLE BIu oF LADING) is conspicuous. Language in
the body of a form is "conspicuous" if it is in larger or other contrasting type or color.
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heading printed in capitals, if it is in larger or contrasting type or
color in the body of a printed form, or if it is embodied in a telegram.55
The requirement for conspicuousness is one of the most difficult
for the courts to resolve due, in major part, to the extensive use of
standard form contracts in commercial and consumer transactions.
Disclaimers written in the same size and color as other paragraphs
of the sales contract and placed on the reverse side of the contract
have been held not conspicuous. 5 The courts have also rejected
disclaimer provisions which appear in smaller print,57 in slightly
larger print than that of the preceding paragraph,58 or in slightly
contrasting print.5 Disclaimer language appearing in italics was
found to provide insufficient contrast in a recent California decisionA0 Conversely, the Sixth Circuit, in United States Fibres, Inc.
v. Proctor & Schwartz, rejected an argument that a disclaimer
printed in the same size and color of print as the remainder of the
contract would be per se invalid."
A study of cases wherein conspicuousness is at issue discloses
two noteworthy facts. First, a number of the decisions which found
a disclaimer clause not conspicuous also found the clause misleading or ambiguous.6 3 The conclusion might be drawn that an ambiguBut in a telegram any stated term is "conspicuous". Whether a term or clause is
"conspicuous" or not is for decision by the court.
55. Id.
56. E.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Wilson Plumbing Co., 132 Ga. App. 435, 208 S.E.2d 321
(1974); Jerry Alderman Ford Sales, Inc. v. Bailey, 154 Ind. App. 632, 294 N.E.2d 617 (1973).
The following cases give examples of disclaimers held not "conspicuous." National Cash
Register Co. v. Adell Indus., Inc., 57 Mich. App. 413, 225 N.W.2d 785 (1975); Sellman Auto,
Inc. v. McCowan, 513 P.2d 1228 (Nev. 1973); Rehurek v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 262 So.2d
452 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 267 So.2d 833 (Fla. 1972); Orange Motors of Coral Gables, Inc.
v. Dade County Dairies, Inc., 258 So. 2d 319 (Fla. App. 1972); Hunt v. Perkings Mach. Co.,
352 Mass. 535, 226 N.E.2d 228 (1967). The "conspicuous" requirement was used by analogy
in a lease transaction to negate a disclaimer. Redfern Meats, Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 134 Ga.
App. 381, 215 S.E.2d 10 (1975).
57. Atlas Industries, Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 216 Kan. 213, 531 P.2d 41
(1975).
58. Dorman v. International Harvester Co., 46 Cal. App. 3d 11, 120 Cal. Rptr. 516
(1975).
59. Sarnecki v. Al Johns Pontiac, 56 Luz. Reg. 293 (Pa. C.P. 1966).
60. Dorman v. International Harvester Co., 46 Cal. App. 3d 11, 120 Cal. Rptr. 576
(1975).
61. 509 F.2d 1043 (6th Cir. 1975).
62. Id. at 1046-47.
63. Dorman v. International Harvester Co., 46 Cal. App. 3d 11, 120 Cal. Rptr. 516
(1975), and cases cited in notes 25-26 supra. See also Mack Trucks'of Ark., Inc. v. Jet Asphalt
& Rock Co., 246 Ark. 101, 437 S.W.2d 459 (1969) (court held the disclaimer to be ineffective
for lack of conspiciousness and timeliness-attempt to disclaim made at time of delivery of
trucks which was several months after the contract had been signed).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol2/iss2/5

19771

A SURVEY OF WARRANTY

PROTECTION

ous clause will no doubt also lack conspicuousness, although this
would not necessarily follow in every case. Second, courts have used
the existence of an inequality in bargaining power, such as in a
consumer sale, as a critical factor in resolving the issue of conspicuousness.6
An interesting question in this area is posed where the buyer
admits to reading what is apparently a non-conspicuous disclaimer.
In such a case does a non-conspicuous clause thereby become
conspicuous? In Rehurek v. Chrysler Credit Corp.,65 the buyer admitted reading a non-conspicuous disclaimer, to which the court
nonetheless declined to give effect. A contrary result was reached in
an Oklahoma case where, on similar facts, it was held that the
requirement of conspicuousness was inapplicable to the case at bar
due to the admission that the purchaser had read the disclaimer."
Section 2-316(3) provides, inter alia, alternative methods of
disclaiming the implied warranties of merchantability or fitness
for a particular purpose. 7 Use of the terms "as is" and "with all
faults" permits the seller to disclaim all implied warranties without
use of the term "merchantability" as required under 2-316(2).6s
Although section 2-316(3) requires the use of language "which
in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied warranty," it does not require the language to be conspicuous. 9 Yet, in
FairchildIndustries v. Maritime Air Service, Ltd.,7" the Maryland
Court required a disclaimer containing the words "as is" to be conspicuous, concluding that "to allow the exclusion of implied warranties through inconspicuous use of the simple words 'as is' obscured
in the middle of a contract would be contrary to the spirit of the
UCC and to the policy disfavoring exclusion of warranties and
64. Sellman Auto, Inc. v. McCowan, 89 Nev. 353, 513 P.2d 1228 (1973) (in determining
whether the disclaimer of warranties is effective consideration, must be given to the circumstances that the market sophistication of the seller exceeds that of the buyer).
65. 262 So. 2d 452 (Fla. App. 1972).
66. Smith v. Sharpensteen, 521 P.2d 394 (Okla. 1974).
67. For the text of U.C.C. § 2-316, see note 4 supra.
68. Id.
69. Several jurisdictions require conspicuousness for "as is" clauses. E.g., Fairchild
Industries v. Maritime Air Service, Ltd., 274 Md. 181, 333 A.2d 313 (1975); Osborne v.
Genevie, 289 So. 2d 21 (Fla. App. 1974); Woodruff v. Clark County Farm Bureau Coop.
Ass'n., Inc., 153 Ind. App. 31, 286 N.E.2d 188 (1972); Gindy Mfg. Corp. v. Cardinale Trucking
Corp., 111 N.J. Super. 383, 268 A.2d 345 (Sup. Ct. 1970). Contra, Dekalb Agresearch, Inc. v.
Abbott, 391 F. Supp. 152 (N.D. Ala. 1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d 1162 (5th Cir. 1975) (Code provisions not controlling on lease disclaimer). See also 1 W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE
TO THE U.C.C. 76-77 (A.L.I. 1964); Note, 41 TENN. L. REv. 958 (1974).
70. 274 Md. 181, 333 A.2d 313 (1975).
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construing such disclaimer against the seller." 7'
The buyer's examination of the goods or his refusal to do so
following a demand by the seller will operate as a disclaimer of any
implied warranties as to defects which the examination ought to
have revealed to the buyer.72 Certainly, the skill and expertise of the
buyer would be important in determining whether or not a particular defect ought to have been discovered. Thus, the purchaser of a
used car, who was not a mechanic but who had test driven the
automobile, was not precluded from recovering under an implied
warranty of merchantability.73 Furthermore, the examination provisions of 2-316(3)(b) do not extend to latent defects. The implied
warranty would likewise not be excluded where the seller was obligated to perform specific services with respect to the goods after
delivery and the defect was not apparent until the services had been
provided.74
Section 2-316(3)(c) permits the seller to exclude an implied
warranty by course of performance,75 course of dealing, and usage
71. Id. at 190, 333 A.2d at 318.
72. U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(b):
when the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the goods or the sample
or model as fully as he desired or has refused to examine the goods there is no implied
warranty with regard to defects which an examination ought in the circumstances to
have revealed to him . . .
73. Rose v. Epley Motor Sales, 288 N.C. 53, 215 S.E.2d 573 (1975); Overland Bond &
Investment Corp. v. Howard, 9 Ill. App. 3d 348, 292 N.E.2d 168 (1972). See also Alan Wood
Steel Co. v. Capital Equip. Enterprises Inc., 39 Ill App. 3d 48, 349 N.E.2d 627 (1976) (significant reliance by the buyer on his examination of the product before the deal is completed
discounts reliance on seller's affirmations and precludes the creation of an express warranty).
74. Performance Motors, Inc. v. Allen, 280 N.C. 385, 186 S.E.2d 161 (1972); David v.
Vintage Enter., Inc., 23 N.C. App. 581, 209 S.E.2d 824 (1974). For the effect of buyer's failure
to make a full examination where the seller's conduct or assurance caused the buyer to refrain
from making a thorough examination which would have revealed the defect, see Annot., 168
A.L.R. 389, 402-04 (1947).
75. U.C.C. § 2-208:
(1) Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions for performance by
either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity for
objection to it by the other, any course of performance accepted or acquiesced in
without objection shall be relevant to determine the meaning of the agreement.
(2) The express terms of the agreement and any such course of performance, as
well as any course of dealing and usage of trade, shall be construed whenever reasonable as consistent with each other; but when such construction is unreasonable, express
terms shall control course of performance and course of performance shall control both
course of dealing and usage of trade (Section 1-205).
(3) Subject to the provisions of the next section on modification and waiver, such
course of performance shall be relevant to show a waiver or modification of any term
inconsistent with such course of performance.
See Spurgeon v. Jamieson Motors, 164 Mont. 296, 521 P.2d 924 (1974); R.D. Lowrance, Inc.
v. Peterson, 185 Neb. 679, 178 N.W.2d 277 (1970).
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of trade." Official Comment 7 to section 2-316 states, in part, that
terms like "as is," "as they stand," and "with all faults,"
in ordinary commercial usage are understood to mean that the buyer
takes the entire risk as to the quality of the goods involved. The terms
covered by paragraph (a) ["as is," etc.] are in fact merely a particularization of paragraph (3) Which provides for exclusion or modification of implied warranties by usage of trade.
A disclaimer of implied warranties by trade usage would be effective
only by proof that a party against whom the disclaimer is asserted
was or should have been aware of the particular trade usage.7 7
C. Limitation of Remedies and Exclusion of Consequential
Damages - In General
Article 2 of the Code contains an extensive array of cumulative
remedies for breach of the sales contract.7 1 Under section 2-719, 71 the
parties are left free to bargain for additional or substitutional remedies as well as to alter the measure of damages consistent with
section 2-718.10 The limitation of remedy clause in a contract routinely limits the remedies available to the buyer, either by imposing
upon the seller a duty to repair or replace defective goods or component parts, or to return the purchase price. This type of clause, if
valid, would also exclude other claims of a remedial nature, the
most common of which would be a claim for damages to protect the
expectation interest of the purchaser.
Any attempt to exclude certain remedies or limit damages for
breach of warranty must be tested upon the basis of the language
used in the limitation. Unless the language used is clear and unmistakable the provision may fail of its intended purpose. In Gramling
76.

U.C.C. § 1-205:
(1) A course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct between the parties to
a particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis
of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct.
(2) A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing having such regularity
of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be
observed with respect to the transaction in question. ...
77. See Zicari v. Joseph Harris Co., 33 App. Div. 2d 7, 304 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1969).
78. U.C.C. § 1-106 (Remedies to Be Liberally Administered). See U.C.C. § 2-703
(Seller's Remedies in General) and § 2-711 (Buyer's Remedies in General; Buyer's Security
Interest in Rejected Goods) for an index of remedies under Article 2 of the UCC.
79. For the text of U.C.C. § 2-719, see note 5 supra.
80. U.C.C. § 2-718:
(1) Damages for breach of either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only
at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused
by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility
of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy.
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v. Baltz,5 ' the plaintiff's claim for consequential damages for breach
of implied warranty was not excluded by a contract provision stating that an express warranty was "in lieu of all other warranties,
express or implied . . . and all other obligations or liabilities, including liability for incidental and consequential damages."' 2 In an
earlier case decided in the same jurisdiction, Ford Motor Co. v.
Reid, u the court emphasized the distinction between "obligations"
and "remedies" in finding that the disclaimer clause under consideration failed in its intended exclusion of all remedies other than
repair or replacement.
Section 2-719 does not specifically authorize the limitation of
remedies or exclusion of consequential damages through course of
dealing, usage of trade, or course of performance, whereas section
2-316(3)(c) permits the exclusion or modification of implied warranties in such a fashion. 4 Yet, a limitation on damages may become
part of the "agreement" of the parties without being subject to
express negotiations. Course of dealing or usage of trade may include the limitation or exclusion of damages term as part of the
"bargain of the parties in fact." 5 Where a commercial buyer of film
had made at least ten purchases of film from the defendant company in the past, and a limitation of liability notice was both
printed on the film container and repeated in the instruction booklet, it was held that the buyer was limited to the remedy stated in
the notice and could not claim damages for consequential losses. 8
The impact of usage of trade or course of performance in limiting
remedies or damages would, however, be less significant in a noncommercial situation. Trade usage can be asserted only against a
81. 253 Ark. 352, 485 S.W.2d 183 (1972).
82. Id. at 358, 485 S.W.2d at 189.
83. 250 Ark. 176, 465 S.W.2d 80 (1971).
84. See note 40 supra for the text of U.C.C. § 2-316.
85. See Posttape Associates v. Eastman Kodak Co., 19 UCC REP. SERV. 832 (3rd Cir.
1976). U.C.C. § 1-201(3) defines the term "agreement" as: "the bargain of the parties in fact
as found in their language or by implication from other circumstances including course of
dealing or usage of trade or course of performance as provided in the act (Sections 1-205 and
2-208) ..
"
86. D.O.V. Graphics v. Eastman Kodak Co., 46 Ohio Misc. 37, 347 N.E.2d 561, 562-63
(1976) in which the court stated:
While it is true here that there is no evidence that the limitation of liability was
"negotiated," it is equally clear that plaintiff ordered defendant's photographic paper
knowing that defendant had stated in its instructions for the use of the paper and on
each package delivered to plaintiff that its liability was limited to replacing any defective paper. The contract therefore for the alleged defective paper consisted of plaintiff's
order for paper knowing that defendant was limiting his liability for any commercial
damages flowing therefrom and its acceptance of the package of paper on which such
limitation of liability was set forth.
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party who is "in the trade" or otherwise chargeable with knowledge
of the usage of that trade."7
The remedies provided in the contract will be considered
merely optional unless the agreement expressly provides they are to
be exclusive. 8 A declaration that the remedy given is exclusive is
sufficient; however, the inclusion of a specific remedy in the contract, without more, is not enough to have the remedy declared
exclusive.' 9
Subsections (2) and (3) of section 2-719 place several restrictions upon the ability to limit remedies. If the remedy is exclusive
and fails of its essential purpose, then the limitation is ineffective
and the buyer may resort to the cumulative remedies given elsewhere in the Code. 0 A contract term on the limitation or exclusion
of consequential damages may also be avoided if it is found to be
'unconscionable."91

Subsection (3) of 2-719 allows for the exclusion of consequential
damages, provided that the exclusionary clause is not unconscionable. Limitations pursuant to this provision have been held valid in
a number of cases involving complex contracts between large and
experienced corporations.2 The exclusion or limitation of damages
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 371 (1972).
U.C.C. § 2-719(1)(b).
See the text of U.C.C. § 2-719(1)(b) note 5 supra.
U.C.C. § 2-719(2).
U.C.C. § 2-719(3). With respect to unconscionability, § 2-302 of the Code states:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce
the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid
any unconscionable result.
Although § 2-302 sets no guidelines for judging what is or may be unconscionable, the Official
Comments cite a number of pre-UCC cases which provide appropriate standards: see, e.g.,
Hardy v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 38 Ga. App. 463, 144 S.E. 327 (1928); Meyer v.
Packard Cleveland Motor Co., 106 Ohio St. 328, 140 N.E. 118 (1922).
Although the language of § 2-302 speaks generally of "any term" in "a contract," unconscionability has been traditionally viewed as a consumer-orientated concept. See, e.g., Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 385 F. Supp. 572, 579 (D.D.C. 1974). It is
probable that unconscionability will continue to be argued primarily in warranty cases where
the consumer has suffered personal injury caused by a defective product.
Section 2-302 must be read in conjunction with the UCC sections concerning disclaimer
of warranties (§ 2-316) and limitation of remedies (§ 2-719). In fact, the term
"unconscionable" appears in § 2-719(3). That section allows the limitation or exclusion of
consequential damages "unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable." The Official
Comments to § 2-719(3) recognize, however, that the seller "in all cases is free to disclaim
warranties in the manner provided in Section 2-316."
92. Council Bros., Inc. v. Ray Burner Co., 473 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1973); U-M Corp. v.
Bernard Distrib. Corp., 447 F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1971); Southwest Forest Indus. Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 422 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1970); Ebasco Serv., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power

87.

See J. WHrrE & R.

88.
89.
90.
91.
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for personal injury where the contract involves consumer goods is
declared prima facie unconscionable under this section. One court
has, on the basis of unconscionability, avoided in toto a limitation
clause dealing with both personal injury and property damage. 3 A
seller's refusal to correct defects under a limitation of remedy clause
has also been the basis for a court's avoidance of the limitation term
on unconscionability grounds."4
The identification of a prima facie case of "unconscionability,"
wherein the claim is one for personal injury in a consumer goods
contract, represents one of the few instances in which the language
of the Code draws a distinction between commercial and consumer
contracts. This dichotomy has resulted in the shifting of
"unconscionability" arguments away from the general
scope of section 2-30211 and into the coverage of section 2-719(3)."
Although the difference between disclaimer or modification of
warrantiesand the limitation of remedies or damages can be crucial,
it is often ignored or inadequately discussed by the courts. The
reader will recall that a disclaimer must meet the specific requirements of section 2-316, including conspicuousness and the mention
of the term "merchantability."" However, if a clause is construed
to be merely a limitation of the remedies available for breach of
warranty, conspicuousness and use of the term "merchantability"
are not statutory requisites for a valid limitation. In Orrox Corp. v.
Rexmond, Inc.," the court made the necessary distinction in finding
the clause to be governed by section 2-719 on limitation of damages,
and Light Co. 17 UCC REP. SERv. 645 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Cyclops Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 389
F. Supp. 476 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 385 F.
Supp. 572 (D.D.C. 1974); Royal Indemnity Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 385 F. Supp.
520 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Raybond Electronics, Inc. v. Glen-Mar Door Mfg. Co., 22 Ariz. App.
409, 528 P.2d 160 (1974). See also Bakal v. Burroughs Corp., 74 Misc. 2d 202, 343 N.Y.S.2d
541 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
93. McCarty v. E.J. Korvette, Inc., 28 Md. App. 421, 347 A.2d 253 (1975). For an
interesting discussion in the extent to which the "unconscionable" concept of § 2-719(3) can
work to avoid a limitation of damages provision, see Collins v. Uniroyal, Inc., 64 N.Y. 260,
315 A.2d 16 (1974). Comment, Uniform Commercial Code: Limitations on Personal Injury
Damagesfor Breach of Warranty - Toward Per Se Unconscionability?,14 WASHEURN L.J. 708
(1975).
94. Koehring Co. v. A.P.I., Inc., 369 F. Supp. 882 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Jacobs v. Metro
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 462, 188 S.E.2d 250 (1972).
95. U.C.C. § 2-302, supra note 91.
96. U.C.C. § 2-719, supra note 4.
97. See the discussion in the text accompanying notes 51-54 supra.
98. 389 F. Supp. 441 (M.D. Ala. 1975). But see Zicari v. Joseph Harris Co., 33 App.
Div. 2d 17, 304 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1969) and Wilson Trading Co. v. David Ferguson, Ltd., 23
N.Y.2d 398, 244 N.E.2d 685, 297 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1969) wherein the requirements of § 2-316
were brought into a limitation of remedy problem.
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not section 2-316 on disclaimer of warranties, thus avoiding the
issue of conspicuousness." Section 2-719 does not impose a requirement that the limitation or exclusion be conspicuous. However, the
conspicuous requirement under section 2-316 on disclaimer of warranties may provide the basis for imposing such a requirement on
limitation clauses governed by section 2-719.00 The decisions have
generally denied such a requirement as a part of an attempt to
clearly differentiate the disclaimer of warranty requirements under
section 2-316 from the exclusion of remedies and the limitation of
damages provisions of section 2-719.101 Some courts, however, as in
Avenell v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,10 have required a clause
limiting remedies under section 2-719 in a commercial contract to
be "in writing and conspicuous." Since the typical limitation clause
will attempt to modify or exclude both warranties and remedies, the
terminology used and its conspicuousness will almost always be in
issue.
D.

Failure of Essential Purpose

Official Comment 1 to section 2-719 clearly mandates that
"minimum adequate remedies" be available as an essential part of
a sales contract.103 Even a clause apparently reasonable at the contract's inception may later operate to deprive either party of its
respective benefits of the bargain. Several decisions, in both consumer and commercial settings, have provided insight into this provision. In Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd., 104a clause
in a yarn contract stated that no claims would be allowed if made
99. Orrox v. Rexnord, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 441, 445 (M.D. Ala. 1975).
100. See Avenell v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 41 Ohio App. 2d 150, 324 N.E.2d 583
(1974).
101. See Cryogenic Equip., Inc. v. Southern Nitrogen, Inc., 490 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1974);
Boone Valley Coop. Proc. Ass'n v. French Oil Mill Mach. Co., 383 F. Supp. 606 (N.D. Iowa
1974); Gramling v. Baltz, 253 Ark. 352, 485 S.W.2d 183 (1972).
102. 41 Ohio App. 2d 150, 324 N.E.2d 583 (1974).
103. U.C.C. § 2-719, Official Comment 1:
[Ilt is of the very essence of a sales contract that at least minimum adequate remedies
be available. If the parties intend to conclude a contract for sale within this Article
they must accept the legal consequence that there be at least a fair quantum of remedy
for breach of the obligations or duties outlined in the contract. Thus any clause purporting to modify or limit the remedial provisions of this Article in an unconscionable
manner is subject to deletion and in that event the remedies made available by this
Article are applicable as if the stricken clause had never existed. ...
104. 23 N.Y.2d 398, 244 N.E.2d 685, 297 N.Y.S.2d 108 (Ct. App. 1969); accord, Neville
Chemical Co., v. Union Carbide Corp., 294 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Pa. 1968), modified, 422 F.2d
1205 (1970). See also Earl M. Jorgensen Co. v. Mark Construction, Inc., 540 P.2d 978 (Hawaii
1975) and National Cash Register Co. v. Adell Indus., Inc., 57 Mich. App. 413, 225 N.W.2d
785 (1975).
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"after weaving, knitting, or processing, or more than ten (10) days
after receipt of shipment." The court found that latent defects rendered the yarn unmerchantable but reasoned the defects might not
have been discoverable within the stated period of time. The buyer
would have been left without a remedy for the defect and, therefore,
the remedy's purpose had failed. Furthermore, at least one court has
stated that the refusal of the seller to correct defects after proper
notice by the purchaser could result in a failure of essential purpose.'15 A similar argument might be based on seller's inability to
cure the defect.'"1
Alternatively, the court may view the alleged "failure" of the
remedy from the perspective of the person against whom the limitation was to operate. In Reynolds v. Preferred Mutual Insurance
Co., 07 the claimant's home furnishings had been damaged by water
leaking into the house due to faulty installation under a home improvement contract. If the court upheld the exclusive remedy of
repair given under the contract, the homeowner could not recover
for the damages to furnishings. The court found the remedy would
not make the consumer whole, therefore failing of its essential purpose, and denied effect to the exclusive remedy provided in the
contract. 10
Unless the exclusion of remedies fails of its essential purpose or
the limitation of damages term is found to be unconscionable, the
modification would be effective in both commercial and consumer
settings, provided the remedy identified is expressly agreed to be
exclusive.
Section 2-719 may also be used to effectively limit damages
based upon tort liability. In PosttapeAssociates v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 10 the court determined that the legislative mandate of the
Code, particularly sections 2-719(3) and 1-210(3),110 was sufficiently
105. Jacobs v. Metro Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 462, 188 S.E.2d 250 (1972)
(decision actually based on § 2-719(3)'s unconscionable provisions). Contra, Lankford v.
Rogers Ford Sales, 478 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972). For a discussion critical of the
Langford decision, see Comment, Uniform Commercial Code-A Limited Remedy Fails of
Its Essential Purpose Only in the Case of a Negligent or Willful Repudiationof the Remedy,
51 TEX. L. Rav. 383 (1972).
106. Eckstein v. Cummings, 41 Ohio App. 2d 1, 321 N.E.2d 897 (1974).
107. 11 UCC REP. SERv. 701 (Mass. Ct. App. 1972).
108. Id. at 708.
109. 19 UCC REP. SERV. 832 (3d Cir. 1976).
110. For the text of § 2-719(3), see note 4 supra. Section 1-201(3) provides:
"Agreement" means the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or by
implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade or
course of performance as provided in this Act (Sections 1-205 and 2-208). Whether an
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encompassing to govern a limitation of damages provision purporting to cover both tort and contract liability. The agreement limiting
such damages, however, must specifically identify the parties' intention to that effect."'
The foregoing discussion has demonstrated that the UCC provides the consumer with a minimal degree of protection in sales
transactions. It remained for the Magnuson-Moss WarrantyFederal Trade Commission Improvement Act to award him an additional range of safeguards.

III. THE MAGNUSON-Moss

WARRANTY Acr

Title I of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act"12 establishes disclosure standards for
written warranties given in the sale of a consumer product with a
retail price of over five dollars."' Furthermore, the Title prescribes
the warranty form and content necessary for compliance with the
Act. Initially, one must note there are several limitations within the
Act which are quite evident. Notably, a supplier of consumer products is not required to give a warranty; no standards are imposed
unless and until a written warranty is made to the consumer. Secondly, only written warranties are covered by the Act,"' whereas
UCC section 2-313 defines express warranties to include oral as well
as written affirmations." 5 These express but non-written warranties
are thus excluded from the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.
The basic definitions within the Warranty Act are, for the most
part, crucial to an understanding of the extent to which warranties
may be excluded. The term "consumer product" under the Warranty Act applies to "any personal property. . . which is normally
used for personal, family, or household purposes""' including such
property intended to be attached to or installed in real property.
This latter inclusion of property intended for attachment to realty
agreement has legal consequences is determined by the provisions of this Act, if applicable; otherwise, by the law of contracts (Section 1-103) (Compare "Contract").
111. See UCC REP. SEnv. supra note 109, at 839.
112. 15 U.S.C. § 2301-12 (Supp. V 1975).
113. For other discussions of the Act, see Magnuson, FairDisclosurein the Marketplace
of Warranty Promises-Truth in Warranties for Consumers, 8 U.C.C.L.J. 117 (1975); Leefe,
A Look at the Consumer Warranty Problem-the Federal Solution, 6 U. TOL. L. REv. 351
(1975), and, Note, The Magnuson-Moss WarrantyAct: ConsumerInformation and Warranty
Regulation, 51 IND. L.J. 397 (1975).
114. 15 U.S.C. § 2303(a) (Supp. V 1975).
115. See note 30 supra for the UCC description of express warranty.
116. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1) (Supp. V 1975).
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(whether actually affixed or not) may expand the range of traditional "consumer products."
A "consumer" is a buyer of any product intended for his own
use rather than for resale; any person to whom such product is
transferred during the duration of an implied or written warranty
(or service contract) applicable to the product; and any other person
who is entitled by the terms of such warranty (or service contract)
or under applicable State law to enforce against the warrantor (or
service contractor) the obligation of the warranty (or service contract).' 7 Two notable features are incorporated within the definition
of "consumer." First, the warranty protection will not terminate
upon subsequent transfer of a consumer product from the original
buyer to another person but will remain in force during the full
warranty period. Second, the definition includes third persons capable of enforcing a consumer product warranty under state law. UCC
section 2-318"' allows definable third parties not in privity of contract with the warrantor to enforce the warranty. Combining the
above categories of persons with the buyer of the consumer product
certainly reflects a legislative policy to protect a broad class of parties under the term "consumer."
A "warrantor" within the Warranty Act is "any supplier or
other person who gives or offers to give a written warranty or who is
or may be obligated under an implied warranty.""' Included within
this definition are persons other than the traditional line-ofdistribution parties (manufacturer, distributor, wholesaler, and retailer). Although a "supplier" is clearly covered by the term warran117.
118.

15 U.S.C. § 2301(3) (Supp. V 1975).
U.C.C. § 2-318:

Alternative A
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who
is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonably
to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is
injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the
operation of this section.
Alternative B
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who
may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is
injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the
operation of this section.
Alternative C'
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any person who may
reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this
section with respect to injury to the person of an individual to whom the warranty
extends. As amended 1966.
119. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(5) (Supp. V 1975).
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tor, since he is one "engaged in the business of making a consumer
product directly or indirectly available to consumers,"'" persons not
involved in the sale transactions, such as product-testing laboratories or product-approval associations, could also fall within the aegis
of the term. It should be noted, however, that although a
''warrantor" can be other than a "supplier," the only warranties
covered by the term "written warranty" are those given by a
"supplier."12 '
"Written warranty" under the Magnuson-Moss Act is defined
as:
(A) any written affirmation of fact or written promise made in
connection with the sale of a consumer product by a supplier to a
buyer which relates to the nature of the material or workmanship and
.affirms or promises that such material or workmanship is defect free
or will meet a specified level of performance over a specified period
of time, or
(B) any undertaking in writing in connection with the sale by a
supplier of a consumer product to refund, repair, replace, or take
other remedial action with respect to such product in the event that
such product fails to meet the specifications set forth in the undertaking.
which written affirmation, promise, or undertaking becomes part of
and a buyer for purposes
the basis of the bargain between a supplier
2
other than resale of such product.
An "implied warranty" under the Act incorporates such warranties as arise under state law.1 23 The portions of the UCC to be
consulted are section 2-314 (implied warranty of merchantability)
and section 2-315 (implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose).
A "remedy" denotes repair of the product, replacement by furnishing an identical or "reasonably equivalent" product, or refund
of the purchase price (less reasonable depreciation as allowed by
Federal Trade Commission rules).2 The warrantor is allowed to
determine which of the remedies shall accompany the warranty,
except that a refund may not be selected unless the consumer's
and repair
consent is obtained, or replacement cannot be provided
2
cannot be effected in a practicable or timely manner. 1
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

15
15
15
15
15
15

U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.

§
§
§
§
§
§

2301(4) (Supp. V 1975).
2301(6)(A) & (B) (Supp. V 1975).
2301(6) (Supp. V 1975).
2301(7) (Supp. V 1975).
2301(10), (11) & (12) (Supp. V 1975).
2301(10) (Supp. V 1975).
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A warrantor opting to extend a written warranty on a consumer
product must clearly and conspicuously designate that warranty as
either a "Full Warranty" or a "Limited Warranty." 216 The Federal
minimum standard for designation as a "Full Warranty" requires
that:
1. The Warrantor will remedy the consumer product without charge
to the consumer and within a reasonable time following defect, malfunction or other failure to conform with the written warranty.
2. No limitation may be imposed by the Warrantor on the duration
of any implied warranty on the product.
3. No exclusion or limitation of consequential damages for breach
of any written or implied warranty is permitted unless such exclusion
or limitation conspicuously appears on the face of the warranty.
4. The consumer may elect a refund or replacement of the product
or part if the product or part still contains a defect or malfunction
after a reasonable number of attempts to remedy the defect have
been made.'2
Any written warranty providing less than the above specifications
2
is a "Limited Warranty" and must be so designated.
A supplier making a written warranty, whether full or limited,
may not disclaim or modify any implied warranty. 2 " However, such
supplier may limit the duration of an implied warranty running
with a "Limited Warranty." The duration may be limited to the
term of the written limited warranty, provided the term is of reasonable duration, the limitation is conscionable, set out in clear and
unmistakable language, and displayed prominently on the face of
the warranty. 13° Action by the Federal Trade Commission may extend the term of a written warranty where the product has failed to
meet the terms of the warranty or the warrantor has failed to carry
out the warranty terms, thus depriving the consumer of the prod13
uct's use for a period not less than ten days. 1
The Warranty Act calls for enforcement of the disclosure provi1
sions either by action of the Attorney General 13 or private action, 3
including a class action if the jurisdictional requirements can be
met.13' The statute also describes the role of the Federal Trade Com126. 15 U.S.C. § 2303(a)(1) & (2) (Supp. V 1975).
127. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (Supp. V 1975).
128.

15 U.S.C. § 2303(a)(2) (Supp. V 1975).

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

15 U.S.C.
15 U.S.C.
15 U.S.C.
15 U.S.C.
15 U.S.C.
15 U.S.C.

§ 2308(b) (Supp. V 1975).
§ 2308(b) (Supp. V 1975).
§ 2302(b)(3) (Supp. V 1975).
§ 2310(c)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
§ 2310(d) (Supp. V 1975).
§ 2310(d)(3) (Supp. V 1975).
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mission in prescribing minimum requirements for establishment of
135
informal dispute settlement procedures.
Section 2308 of the Act permits the limitation of consequential
damages in a written warranty, but under section 2311 state law
"regarding consequential damages for injury to the person or other
injury" is left unimpaired. 131 This provision directly relates to UCC
section 2-719(3) in declaring prima facie unconscionable "any limitation of consequential damages for injury to the persons in the case
of consumer goods." Other state or federal laws affording rights or
1 37
remedies to consumers also remain unaffected.
IV.

IMPACT OF THE MAGNUSON-MOSS WARRANTY ACT ON THE

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE PROVISIONS RELATING TO DISCLAIMER
OF WARRANTIES AND LIMITATION OF REMEDIES AND OR DAMAGES:
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

The total impact of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act on consumer product warranties is obviously susceptible to only general
assessment at this early stage; nevertheless, certain effects can be
stated.
A. The initial movement of the Uniform Commercial Code
and recent decisions to characterize sale of goods transactions as
either consumer or commercial 3 has received a clear mandate by
adoption of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. Although the gap
between consumer and commercial transactions has widened, the
schism is by no means complete. Only issues relating to consumer
warranties have been singled out for coverage under the Act; other
phases of the sales transactions will continue to be governed by state
law, predominantly each state's version of the Code.
B. In order to invoke the provisions of the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act, it is. required not merely that there be a "consumer
product"' 3 ' as the subject of the transaction, but also that a "written
warranty' '1 40 be given. Warranty disputes arising from purely commercial transactions are still governed by UCC sections 2-313
through 2-316. Furthermore, those express warranties under UCC
section 2-313 not reduced to written form are not covered by the
Warranty Act. Thus, the discussion in Part H of this article will
remain viable for commercial transactions.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

15 U.S.C. § 2310(a) (Supp. V 1975).
15 U.S.C. § 2311(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
15 U.S.C. § 2311(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
See note 74 supra.
Defined in 15 U.S.C. 2301(1) (Supp. V 1975).
Defined in 15 U.S.C. 2301(6) (Supp. V 1975).
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C. Section 2308(a) of the Warranty Act states that any implied warranty arising out of a consumer product transaction under
Magnuson-Moss may not be disclaimed."' This vital provision overrides existing state laws under UCC section 2-316 which allows disclaimer of warranties in both consumer and commercial transactions by using the appropriate language in a conspicuous fashion.
The retention of implied warranties for the consumer must certainly
be viewed as one of the more meaningful developments resulting
from the Magnuson-Moss Act.
D. Application of the Warranty Act's provision to a transaction requires that the warranty be identified as either a "Full Warranty" or a "Limited Warranty.""' This designation has no counterpart under the Code.
As noted in paragraph C above, implied warranties cannot be
disclaimed by a supplier. Furthermore, extension of a "Full Warranty" precludes any restriction upon the duration of implied warranties." 3 In other words, any applicable implied warranty will necessarily attach for at least a reasonable period of time. " '
E. The Warranty Act permits the exclusion or limitation of
consequential damages for either written or implied warranties provided the restrictive provision is placed conspicuously on the face
of the warranty." Viewed separately, this measure would clearly
change the restriction on consequential damages found in UCC section 2-719(3). However, section 2311(b)(2) of the Act preserves state
law regarding consequential damages for personal or other injury.
Any clause excluding personal injury damages in a transaction involving consumer goods will remain prima facie unconscionable as
per UCC section 2-719(3). Further, restrictions under state consumer statutes would similarily remain in effect.
The treatment afforded consequential damage restrictions
under the Warranty Act reflects a fundamental difference in attitude between disclaimer of warrantiesand limitation or modification of damages. The same distinction is made under the Code but
with a far different emphasis. The Code allowed disclaimer of warranties in consumer goods transactions but declared a limitation of
damages for personal injury in such transactions prima facie unconscionable."' Conversely, the Warranty Act prevents the total
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

15 U.S.C. § 2301(a) (Supp. V 1975).
15 U.S.C. § 2303(a) (Supp. V 1975).
15 U.S.C. § 2308(a) (Supp. V 1975).
15 U.S.C. § 2308(b) (Supp. V 1975).
15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(3) (Supp. V 1975).
U.C.C. § 2-719(3).
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disclaimer of implied warranties but sets out only modest requirements for an effective limitation of damages clause. "7 From a consumer perspective, it is preferable that the Code restrictions on
limitation of damages operate in tandem with the Magnuson-Moss
prohibitions against disclaimer of implied warranties to achieve the
maximum protection.
F. Generally, the warrantor under the Warranty Act may select the remedy (repair, replacement or refund) that he wishes to
offer in the warranty. " ' Notwithstanding such selection, any other
remedy given by state law or other Federal law remains in effect.",
G. Clarity and precision of language of any permissible restriction upon the normal flow of warranties, remedies, and damages in sales transactions will remain a main issue in both consumer and commercial litigation. The Warranty Act has adopted
key language heretofore litigated under the Code in several key
areas. The term "conspicuously" is used in the Act to qualify the
manner of designating warranties under section 2303 and in specifying the minimum standards for a "Full Warranty" under section
2304. Section 2308 uses the term "conscionable" in a discussion on
limiting the duration of implied warranties. No doubt the construction given the terms "conspicuous" and "unconscionable" under
Code decisions will be given due consideration by state and federal
courts facing a similar term or concept under the Warranty Act.
Future litigation may find the reappearance of old problems wearing
the same coat but with a different label.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act has created a new level of
warranty protection for the consumer. It has not, however,
preempted the field of consumer warranties and it should not be
viewed as a panacea for the grievances, real or alleged, suffered by
consumers in consumer products transactions. A combination of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and the Uniform Commercial Code
appears needed to deal adequately with the multiple issues of disclaimer of warranties, exclusion of remedies, and limitation of
damages.
In evaluating the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, it may be well
to ask how expeditiously consumer grievances are resolved, either
through the grievance settlement procedures to be developed under
147.
148.
149.

15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
15 U.S.C. § 2301(10) (Supp. V 1975).
15 U.S.C. § 2311(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
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the guidance of the Federal Trade Commission or through the
courts. No answer to that question is possible at present. However,
the Act does provide the basis for a rational dichotomy in the treatment of warranties between commercial activities and those involving consumer products. The Code may continue as an appropriate
guide for regulating transactions among merchants; however, consumer transactions have long needed a regulatory scheme going far
beyond that provided by the Code. Perhaps the Uniform
Commercial Code's de minimus effort at regulation of transactions
of the latter type may be best understood in light of the fact that
the Code's adoption preceded the consumer movement by a number
of years. One can state unequivocally that the language of Title I of
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act contains a number of substantial and beneficial
changes for the protection of the buyer of consumer products; it
remains to be seen if their promise becomes a reality for the consumer.
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